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IN 1977, the merchandise  trade  accounts  of the United States  recorded 
the largest  deficit to date-$31.4  billion. Viewed in historical  perspec- 
tive, any  U.S. trade  deficit  is an unusual  occurrence:  until 1971, the U.S. 
trade  balance  had been in surplus  throughout  the twentieth  century.  In 
1977, the United States  had a deficit  of 1.7 percent  of the gross  national 
product,  or 11.5 percent  of the combined  value of merchandise  exports 
plus  imports.  (By comparison,  Italy's  trade  deficit  in 1974 was 10.3 per- 
cent  of trade  value;  the deficit  of the United  Kingdom  was 4.7 percent  in 
1967 and 12.1 percent  in 1974.) The U.S. invisibles  account  showed  a 
substantial  surplus,  however,  so that  the estimated  current-account  deficit 
in 1977 of $19.3 billion was 7.1 percent of the value of merchandise 
trade. 
The present  U.S. trade  deficit  is particularly  conspicuous  because  the 
balance  has declined  precipitously  since late 1975. In 1975:4, the trade 
balance (seasonally adjusted  annual  rate) was an $8.9 billion surplus; 
one year  later  it had become  a deficit  of $14.4 billion,  and  by 1977:4, the 
deficit  had grown  to $35.5 billion. This change  in the trade  balance  re- 
sulted  from  a slow growth  in the value  of U.S. exports  (an increase  of 7.1 
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percent  in 1976 and  5.0 percent  in 1977) and  a rapid  increase  in the value 
of imports  (26.5 percent  in 1976 and  22.4 percent  in 1977).1 
The decline  in the trade  balance  has been widespread  geographically. 
Of the $39.3 billion overall decline between 1975 and 1977:3, the de- 
cline in the trade  balance  between  the United  States  and  developed  coun- 
tries ($14 billion), and that between  the United States  and members  of 
the Organization  of Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  ($13.8 billion), each 
accounts  for slightly  more  than  one-third,  and  the decline  in the trade  bal- 
ance with non-OPEC developing countries accounts for most of the 
remainder. 
Some unusual circumstances  contributed  to the large 1975 surplus 
from which these declines are calculated.  For most of the year, the U.S. 
economy  was in its deepest  postwar  recession,  while many of its trading 
partners  had experienced  much smaller  percentage  declines in output. 
The 11.2 percent  reduction  in import  volumes  in 1975 followed  a 3.3 per- 
cent drop  in 1974. The value of U.S. imports  fell by 5.4 percent  in 1975 
while the value of exports  increased  8.9 percent.  Exports  increased  as a 
result of the expansion  of the OPEC market, the increase of capital- 
goods investment  that followed the bottlenecks  of 1973 to 1974, and a 
strong world grains market.  In addition,  U.S. manufactured  goods en- 
joyed the full cumulative  effects  of the price advantages  conferred  by the 
dollar  devaluations  of December  1971 and 1973. 
Initially  the decline  in the U.S. trade  surplus  was viewed  as a positive 
development.  Americans  recognized  it as a characteristic  of a recovering 
economy.  In other  countries  the decline  was  taken  as an  indication  of good 
prospects  for growth  led by exports. To observers  of the international 
economy,  it implied  that the United States  was at last assuming  its share 
of the "incompressible  OPEC surplus."  Later, as the deficit  grew  in size 
and  confidence  weakened  in the value  of the dollar,  observers  became  less 
sanguine.  In Europe  and Japan,  the apparent  failure  of the United  States 
to adopt energy-conservation  measures  was criticized.  Americans,  how- 
ever, blamed European  and Japanese  policymakers  for not stimulating 
internal  demand  in their  economies. 
Attention  also focused  on the possibility  of a decline  in the U.S. com- 
1. The figures given here and in the following paragraph  refer to merchandise 
exports and imports (excluding certain military goods), balance-of-payments  basis. 
They are taken from "U.S. International  Transactions,"  quarterly  article in Survey 
of Current  Business, vol. 57 (June, September,  and December 1977), table 3, and 
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petitive position. Officials  from the Treasury  and the Federal Reserve 
denied  any  erosion  of the U.S. position,  while  those at the Department  of 
Commerce  were  not that certain.2  Various  observers  cited  additional  fac- 
tors that  have contributed  to the trade  deficit:  the curtailment  of imports 
by less developed  countries  (particularly  those in Latin  America) in re- 
sponse  to their  debt accumulation,  the rapid  growth  of their  manufactur- 
ing capabilities,  the deterioration  of U.S. agricultural  terms  of trade,  and 
the effects  of a particularly  severe  winter  on U.S. oil imports. 
In this paper I present an analysis  of the causes of the current  U.S. 
deficit.  Some are transitory  or cyclical  in nature;  others  indicate  a perina- 
nent change  in the structure  of the world  economy.  Some  are  self-correct- 
ing or are changes  that are expected  to be absorbed,  while others  may 
require  policy  measures  in the short  or long  run.  A quantitative  assessment 
of these different  causes  is important  for the design  of appropriate  policy. 
Commodity  Composition  of the  Trade  Balance 
In table 1, the merchandise  trade balance is decomposed  into cate- 
gories of major  commodities.  Between 1975 and 1977, the overall  bal- 
2.  "The swing in the trade balance is due almost entirely to two factors: (1)  the 
growing U.S. dependence on foreign oil  and (2)  the fact that our major trading 
partners  have achieved less than we by way of sustained  economic expansion. There 
has been no significant loss of  U.S. competitiveness in this picture." (Remarks by 
C. Fred Bergsten, Assistant Secretary of  the Treasury for International Affairs, 
before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 
U.S.  Department of  the Treasury, News,  B-532, November 3,  1977, p.  1.)  "An 
examination  of the share of U.S. exports in the markets of particular  countries  indi- 
cates that we have not experienced  a declining share in most of them....  An exami- 
nation of  .  .  . exchange rates adjusted for different degrees of price inflation here 
and abroad ...  also suggests that neither our export nor our domestic economy has, 
over the past 2 years, lost price competitiveness."  (Statement by Henry C. Wallich, 
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcom- 
mittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, November 3, 1977, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 63, November 1977, p. 985.)  "The consensus among 
economists is that a decline in U.S. competitiveness is not a primary cause of the 
U.S. trade deficit at this time. This does not mean, however, that the U.S. may not 
have experienced some loss in its relative competitive position or that competitive- 
ness is not a problem for the United States."  (Statement  by Frank A. Weil, Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business, before the Joint 
Senate-House Subcommittee on  International Economics of  the Joint Economic 
Committee, October 11, 1977; processed, p. 7.) C  >N  4 
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ance declined  by $40.4 billion.  Nearly  $19 billion  of this  was a decline  in 
the balance  in fuels and  lubricants  from  rising  fuel imports.  An additional 
$17.1 billion was a decline in the balance in manufactured  goods. Al- 
though substantial  changes occurred  in the prices and total values of 
individual  agricultural  imports  and exports-including a $2.3 billion in- 
crease  in the value of green coffee imports,  a $1.1 billion decline in the 
value of grains  exports,  and a $1.1 billion rise in soybean  exports-the 
overall  agricultural  balance  declined  by only $1.9 billion.  In the remain- 
der of the paper  I focus on fuels and manufactured  goods, the two com- 
modity  categories  responsible  for most of the change  in the trade  balance 
between  1975 and 1977. 
Fuels  and  Lubricants  Trade 
Table  2 summarizes  U.S. fuels trade  in recent  years.  The value  of U.S. 
imports  of fuels has increased  dramatically,  from $8.3 billion  in 1973 to 
$28.5 billion  in 1975 to $47.4 billion  in 1977. The volume  of imports  has 
risen  to fill the growing  gap between  increasing  domestic  energy  demand 
and declining  domestic  supply.  Domestic  production  of crude  oil fell by 
3.1 percent  from 1975 to 1976, and an additional  2.0 percent  through 
mid-1977,  continuing  a decline  that  has averaged  3.5 percent  a year  since 
1972. This  trend  was reversed  in the second  half of 1977 with  the opening 
of the Alaskan  pipeline.  Total domestic  petroleum  demand  rose 6.9 per- 
cent  in 1976 and 5.7 percent  in 1977, inducing  increases  of 20.5 and 19.5 
percent  in import  volumes  in the two years.  Between  1975 and 1977, the 
share  of imports  in total petroleum  consumption  rose from  37 to 47 per- 
cent. U.S. imports  have grown  faster  than those of other, more import- 
dependent  economies,  in part because the United States began with an 
import  base that was a smaller  percentage  of overall  supplies. 
Because  the members  of OPEC  have spent some of their  proceeds  on 
U.S. exports,  it would  be incorrect  to consider  the entire  increase  in U.S. 
fuels expenditure  as widening  the trade  deficit.  The long-run  respending 
coefficient  is probably  only about  16 cents  to the dollar,  however,  so that 
most of our oil increase  does lead to a decline  in the trade  balance.3 
3.  In 1976, OPEC imports of goods (f.o.b.) increased  by about two-thirds  of the 
increase in OPEC export earnings. The United States had an 18 percent share in 
the OPEC market, so that direct respending amounted to  12 cents per dollar. In- en  tn  00 00  t- 
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The growth  in fuel demand  in 1977 was extraordinary.  Given  the 6.0 
percent  growth  in U.S. real  GNP between  1975 and 1976, the 6.9 percent 
rise in domestic  demand  for petroleum  products  in 1976 was not unex- 
pected.  In the first  nine  months  of 1977, however,  the  rise  in refined  petro- 
leum  demand  of 8.0 percent,  accompanied  by an increase  of 24.3 percent 
in oil imports,  occurred  despite  a rise  of only  4.7 percent  in real  GNP over 
the same period. An exceptionally  cold winter and poor rainfall  in the 
Northwest,  which  led to a dramatic  loss in hydroelectric  power,  accounted 
for this  extraordinary  rise  in demand. 
U.S. imports averaged  8.8 million barrels  a day (mbd) for the first 
nine months  of 1977.4  My estimates  would attribute  about  0.36 mbd in 
the first  quarter  to the effects  of the cold winter  on the demand  of resi- 
dential and commercial  establishments  for extra heating oils; perhaps 
0.1 mbd over the winter  because  increased  demand  by high-priority  resi- 
dential  users  reduced  natural  gas available  to commercial,  industrial,  and 
utility  establishments;  and 0.43 mbd for the full nine months  because  of 
the loss of hydroelectric  power.  Together  these  unusual  events  raised  im- 
ports  by 0.57 mbd  over  the nine months,  or a total  of 154 million  barrels. 
At $13.26 a barrel,  the implied  increase  in U.S. dollar  imports  was $2.0 
billion,  or an annual  rate  of $2.7 billion.5  In addition,  demand  was appar- 
ently enlarged  by an unusual  buildup  of oil inventories  in 1977. Total 
stocks  of crude  oil and  refined  products  in the third  quarter  of 1977 were 
about  11 percent  greater  than  those  a year  earlier. 
Realistic  projections  put 1985 oil imports  at about  12 mbd.  These  pro- 
jections  imply an average  annual  growth  in the volume  of oil imports  of 
directly, however, OPEC spending would raise incomes abroad and thus increase 
U.S. exports to third countries. A  rough estimate adds an additional 3.4 cents of 
U.S. exports from this source. There would also be some additional  OPEC purchases 
of services. 
4.  The calculations here use U.S.  Bureau of  Mines figures from the Monthly 
Energy Review. Measured  on a balance-of-payments  basis, imports tend to be about 
one-half million barrels  a day larger. 
5.  Additional demand for heating oil was estimated  using a method suggested  by 
Heywood Fleisig of the Federal Reserve Board. An elasticity of a 9 percent increase 
in fuel use for a 10 percent increase in degree-days  was obtained from American 
Society of Heating, Refrigerating  and Air-Conditioning  Engineers,  ASHARE Guide 
and Data Book: Systems, 1970 (ASHARE, 1970), p. 628. The effect of the natural 
gas curtailment  on industry was derived by comparing actual demand with an esti- 
mate by the U.S. Department  of Energy, which assumes normal weather conditions. 
The estimate of the loss of hydropower assumes that the entire shortfall in power 
production  from its 1975 level was met by oil imports. 166  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1978 
between  3.5 and  4.5 percent  from 1977 to 1985. Thus  the 1976 and 1977 
growth  rates  of over  20 percent  seem to be transitory.  If the real  value  of 
total imports  grows at historic  rates and real oil prices are held to a 2 
percent  annual  increase  through  1985, the oil component  will not grow 
more  rapidly  than  the overall  value  of imports. 
Manufactured-Goods  Trade 
Manufactured  goods  account  for approximately  two-thirds  of U.S. mer- 
chandise  exports  and about half of U.S. imports.  Because  most compo- 
nents in the remainder  of U.S. trade (agriculture,  fuel, and other crude 
materials-primarily  lumber  and ores) have low income and very low 
price elasticities  of demand and supply, manufactured  goods are even 
more  significant  than these  proportions  would  suggest  in determining  the 
overall responsiveness  of the trade balance to changes  in incomes and 
prices.  As indicated  in table 3, export  unit  values  have risen  more  rapidly 
since 1975 than import  unit values. This improvement  in the terms of 
trade has been overwhelmed  by a stagnation  in export volumes and a 
rapid  growth  in import  volumes,  resulting  in a steady  decline  in the bal- 
ance of trade  in manufactured  goods from $20.0 billion  in 1975, to $5.2 
billion  in the first  half of 1977, and  $0.7 billion  in the second  half of 1977. 
There  is almost  unanimous  agreement  that  the disparity  in the rates  of 
cyclical  expansion  between  the United  States  and  its trading  partners  has 
been a major  factor  in this deterioration.  However,  the contribution  made 
by a decline  in the U.S. competitive  position  has been the subject  of con- 
siderable debate. In particular,  some administration  spokesmen  have 
strongly  denied that there is any evidence  of a "competitive  decline."  I 
turn  first  to this  issue. 
THE  U.S.  COMPETITIVE  SITUATION 
A change  in competitiveness  between  two economies  can arise either 
from  a change  in the relative  prices  of their  tradable  goods or a change  in 
their  relative  exchange  rates. In a world of multilateral  trade  and many 
tradable  commodities,  no simple measure  can accurately  portray  a na- 
tion's  competitiveness.  Several  indicators  are  presented  in table  4. 
Although  the measures  differ  in order  of magnitude,  they indicate  an Robert Z. Lawrence  167 
improvement  in U.S. competitiveness  between  1970 and 1974 and a sub- 
sequent  erosion  of competitiveness  between  1975 and 1976. If prices  have 
their  effects  with  some  lag, this  erosion  should  provide  part  of the  explana- 
tion for the recent  growth  in the trade  deficit;  it is still too early  for the 
improved  competitiveness  of recent  quarters  to have affected  trade  flows. 
Assuming  raw-materials  costs in different  countries  increase  by similar 
amounts,  relative  export  prices  will be determined  by standard  unit labor 
costs (wages in relation to normal productivity),  profit margins,  and 
exchange  rates.6  Although  the relative  price of U.S. exports  fell sharply 
between  1970 and 1974 (column 1), it did not decline  by the same  order 
of magnitude  as the dollar-denominated  standard  unit labor costs (col- 
umn 6).  This suggests  that U.S. exporters  enjoyed an improvement  in 
their profit  margins  relative  to those of other exporters.  About half the 
decrease in relative standard  unit labor costs over this period can be 
attributed  to changes  in exchange  rates  and  half to a smaller  rise in stan- 
dard  unit labor costs in the United States. 
The turnaround  of roughly 15 percent  in relative  export  prices from 
1975:1 to 1976:2 (column 1) parallels  exchange  rates remarkably;  in 
domestic currencies,  relative standard  unit labor costs did not change 
appreciably,  and the similarity  of changes  in prices and standard  unit 
labor costs suggests  that relative  profit  margins  remained  constant.  The 
rise from 1975 appears  to have been smaller  in relative  import  prices 
than in relative  export  prices,  but more  persistent;  relative  import  prices 
increased  only in the third  quarter  of 1977. This could reflect  a greater 
willingness  on the part  of foreign  sellers  to maintain  their  dollar  prices  in 
the U.S. market  or the larger  role that  developing  countries  (with  weaker 
currencies)  have in U.S. imports  of manufactured  goods.7 
6.  Standard unit  labor costs  were estimated using the  method described by 
Charles L. Schultze, "Falling Profits, Rising Profit Margins, and the Full-Employ- 
ment Profit Rate," BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 449-69.  The cyclical variables used in this 
estimation  were those of Jacques R. Artus, "Measures  of Potential Output  in Manu- 
facturing for Eight Industrial Countries, 1955-78," International Monetary Fund, 
Staff Papers, vol. 24  (March 1977),  pp. 1-35,  and an unpublished update of the 
Artus material,  provided  by the IMF. 
7. From June 1976 to June 1977, the Department of Commerce's  index of the 
effective dollar exchange rate, which uses the U.S. import-weighted  exchange rates 
of fourteen developed countries, indicated a 4 percent depreciation  of the dollar; a 
similar index using the exchange rates of sixty-seven countries showed an apprecia- 
tion of  1 percent. Calculated from data in U.S. Department  of Commerce, Interna- 
tional Economic Indicators,  vol. 3 (September  1977). C;  "CI  tO  C;  C;  C 
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Table  4. Indicators  of the U.S. Competitive  Position, 1970-77a 
Year  PXus  PWPIUs  Pxus  PWPIuts  Effective  dollar  SULCUs 
or  PXUNS  PMUs  PWPluS  PWP1ROWS exchange  rateb  SULCROWS 
quarter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1970  100  100  100  100  100.0  100 
1971  94  97  99  96  97.3  95 
1972  87  93  98  90  90.3  85 
1973  79  89  97  81  82.6  74 
1974  79  83  97  81  84.7  72 
1975  82  83  102  83  82.8  70 
1976  88  86  104  86  90.3  76 
1975:1  78  82  102  80  79.8  ... 
2  79  80  104  80  80.0  ... 
3  85  83  102  85  85.0  ... 
4  88  85  102  87  86.6  ... 
1976:1  89  86  104  87  87.9  ... 
2  90  85  104  87  91.1  ... 
3  87  85  104  86  91.0  ... 
4  86  86  106  86  91.4  ... 
1977:1  83  87  104  85  91.0 
2  83  88  102  85  90.5  ... 
3  84  86  104  83  89.6  ... 
4  82  86  105  ...  87.6 
Sources: Derived from  official series of  the Department of  Commerce, Bureau of  Labor Statistics, 
the Federal Reserve Board, and the United Nations; standard unit labor costs were estimated as described 
in text note 6. 
a. The symbols are defined as follows: 
PXUs  =  unit-value index of U.S. exports of manufactured  goods. 
PXUN8  =  United Nations  unit-value index of  exports of  manufactured goods,  with  the  United 
States removed, expressed in dollars. 
PMUS  =  unit-value index of imports of U.S. manufactured  goods. 
P WPIUS  =  wholesale price index of U.S. manufactured  goods. 
P WPIROw$  =  wholesale prices of  manufactured goods  of  six  major industrial countries (ROW  = 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy (except  1977:3), Japan, United  Kingdom),  weighted 
by  1970 shares in  world manufactured-goods trade, converted to  dollars. 
SULCUS  =  U.S.  standard  unit  labor  costs. 
SULCROW  =standard  unit labor costs for six major industrial countries (ROW), converted to dollars. 
b. Effective dollar exchange rate of the Federal Reserve System. 
As column 3 indicates,  export prices have risen faster than the U.S. 
wholesale  price  index in the 1974-76 period.  But the hypothesis  that the 
increase  in the relative  prices of U.S. manufactured  exports  is due to a 
relative  rise in the demand  for these goods is rejected  by data  on the U.S. 
share  of world export  markets  for manufactured  goods. This share  pro- 
vides  a rough  measure  of U.S. performance  in competing  for the available Robert  Z. Lawrence  171 
demand,  and automatically  corrects  for the relatively  slower growth  in 
U.S. export  markets  by excluding  U.S. imports  from the total. On this 
basis, the U.S. share of manufactured-goods  export  trade  for 1960 and 
for the 1970s until  the first  quarter  of 1977 was as follows:8 
1960  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977:1 
0.235  0.190  0.181  0.180  0.189  0.199  0.197  0.183  0.181 
The share  has declined  by nearly  2 percentage  points  since 1974, largely 
between  1975 and 1976. 
Table 5 illustrates  the widespread  nature  of the decline  in U.S. market 
shares.  That  table  shows  the U.S. share  of the total  dollar  value  of exports 
of industrial  countries  to individual  major  areas.  Only  the share  of exports 
to Canada  improved  between  1975 and 1977. As might  be expected,  the 
improvement  in U.S. shares  from 1972 to 1974 and the decline in the 
most recent  period  are smaller  for values  than  for volumes.  But such  data 
on value shares  should  not be used as indicators  of short-run  changes  in 
competitiveness.  Indeed,  value  measures  might  even improve  temporarily 
in the face of a competitive  deterioration  because  of relatively  low short- 
run price elasticities;  but the evidence  suggests  that, over longer  periods 
of time,  price  elasticities  are significantly  greater  than  unity. 
It would  be helpful  to have  volume-shares  data  on manufactured  goods 
for particular  markets  to test the hypothesis  that U.S. trade  is relatively 
more  concentrated  in areas  that  are  stagnating  than  is trade  of other  major 
exporters  of manufactured  goods. Unfortunately,  no detailed  recent in- 
formation  on manufactured-goods  exports  to particular  markets  is avail- 
able. 
Several  analysts  have argued  that the weakness  in U.S. exports  stems 
from  the large  proportion  of capital  goods  in the total. In fact, weak  capi- 
tal-goods  exports  have not been an unusual  factor  in the deterioration  of 
the manufactured-goods  balance. In volume terms, U.S. capital goods 
have indeed performed  poorly, changing  for three successive  half years 
at annual  rates of 4.6 percent  in the first  half of 1976, -10.5  percent  in 
8. The share is computed as the ratio of the quantity  index of U.S. manufactured- 
goods exports to the quantity index of  manufactured-goods  exports of  ten major 
industrialized  countries. U.S. manufactured-goods  imports from those ten countries 
have been removed from the denominator. United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics, various March, June, September, and December issues, "Manufactured 
Goods Exports"  tables. >  oS  55ccN 
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the second  half of 1976, and 4.4 percent  in the first  half of 1977. But the 
unit values of U.S. exports  of capital  goods increased  by 8.1, 10.1, and 
0.5 percent,  with the surprising  result that in 1976 the share of capital 
goods in the total value of U.S. exports  was 33.3 percent-the  highest 
since 1972.9 
No single  index can adequately  capture  the numerous  factors  that  de- 
termine  a country's  success in international  markets.  "Competitiveness" 
is influenced  by nonprice  factors  that  defy  easy  measurement.  Some  of the 
factors  that complicate  the task of predicting  performance  are the heter- 
ogeneous  nature  of the goods entering  international  trade;  differences  in 
marketing,  servicing,  reputation  for quality;  and the availability  of trade 
financing.  Nonetheless, these are unlikely to  change radically in the 
short run, and the analysis  in this section leads to the conclusion  that, 
after  dramatic  improvement  from 1970 to 1974, U.S. price competitive- 
ness deteriorated  to a position  similar  to that  at the time  of the 1973 dollar 
devaluation.  The data on effective  exchange  rates, market  shares, and 
relative  export  prices  point consistently  to this conclusion.  I now turn  to 
making  quantitative  estimates  of the effect on the trade  balance  of both 
this changing competitiveness  and the effect of  the differing  relative 
growth  rates experienced  here and abroad. 
Econometric  Evidence 
Equations  estimating  the volume of exports  and imports  of manufac- 
tured goods are reported  in table 6. Semiannual  data are used, and all 
variables  are entered  as logarithms  so that the coefficients  may be inter- 
preted as elasticities.  Equations  6-1 and 6-3 are estimated  through  the 
first  half of 1977; equations  6-2 and 6-4 are estimated  through  the first 
half  of 1975, when  the trade  balance  peaked. 
EXPORTS 
The volume  of U.S. exports  of manufactured  goods,  X, is explained  by 
three determinants:  the ratio of actual  output  to potential  output  in the 
"rest of the world" (Q/Q*)ROW;  distributed-lagged values of the ratio of 
prices  of manufactured  goods in the United  States  to the United  Nations 
9. In the first half of 1977, however, this share declined to 32.1 percent. 111:1  10,  5 110,  'co:  44),  C)  11.0  w  0 
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index  of unit values  of manufactured-goods  exports,  IRPX;  and  the level 
of potential  output  in the rest  of the world,  Q*ROW.  Unfortunately,  consis- 
tent estimates  of potential  output  in manufacturing  were available  on a 
semiannual  basis for only the major industrial  countries-the  United 
States, Canada, Japan, Germany,  France, the United Kingdom, and 
Italy-which together  accounted  for 63.7 percent  of world  manufactured- 
goods trade in 1970.10 The estimates  for these countries  (excluding  the 
United  States)  were  weighted  by their  1970 shares  in world  manufactured- 
goods trade  and  used as a proxy  for the rest  of the world  in forming  both 
QROW  and  Q*ROW. 
Output Effects.  Both potential  output  and  the ratio  of actual  to poten- 
tial output  were  used as explanatory  variables  to capture  cyclical  effects  as 
well as conventional  secular  elasticities.  The coefficient  of Q* indicates 
the net effect of foreign  long-run  supply  and demand  elasticities  of U.S. 
exports.  Q/Q* would  be positive  if foreign  demand  for U.S. exports  were 
especially  influenced  by small or negative  output gaps or if tightening 
supply constraints  abroad expanded imports of U.S. substitutes.  The 
similar  magnitude  of the coefficients  of Q* and Q/Q* in both equations 
6-1 and 6-2 suggests  that foreign  output  alone is a sufficient  explanatory 
variable  for U.S. manufactured  exports,  and that, surprisingly,  there are 
no extraordinary  cyclical  effects. 
Some  attempts  to introduce  other  variables  in explaining  exports  failed, 
but are worth reporting.  The U.S. manufactured-goods  output  gap was 
not statistically  significant.  This supports  the notion  that  the United  States 
is a large,  inward-directed  economy,  in which  low levels of capacity  utili- 
zation do not stimulate  exports, independent  of the effect reflected  in 
prices, and high levels are not a constraint  on supplying  the foreign 
market.  Attempts  to model  explicitly  the demand  of less developed  coun- 
tries did not improve  the results.  The most ambitious  of these was the 
construction  of an industrial  production  index for the rest of the world 
that combined  the OECD indexes of industrial  production  for Europe, 
Japan, and Canada  with an industrial  production  index for developing 
market  economies." Specifications  of nonlinearity  in the ratio of actual 
10. These estimates use a modified Cobb-Douglas  production  function, by Artus, 
"Measures  of Potential Output." 
11. To mitigate the omission of  an explicit LDC demand variable, the shares 
variable reported above was used as the dependent  variable; independent  variables 
were specified in the same manner as those in the export equations. This yielded 
results  and out-of-sample  forecasts very similar  to equations  6-1 and 6-2. 176  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1978 
to potential  output or division of the cycle into phases-according to 
whether  the ratio  was rising  or falling  and  whether  it was above  or below 
the long-run  average-did not yield significant  results.  A weighted  aver- 
age of the volume  of investment  in machinery  and equipment  in Canada, 
Japan,  the United  Kingdom,  and Germany  was not significant  in captur- 
ing cyclical  effects.  Finally, lagged  output  variables  were not significant. 
Price Eflects.  The relative-price  term  in the equations  measures  the ef- 
fect of price competitiveness  and is entered  with a distributed  lag. The 
sum of ocefficients  (and each individual  coefficient) is expected to be 
negative. The inclusion of U.S. export prices in the denominator  and 
numerator  of the relative-price  term  makes  these  coefficients  about  16 per- 
cent larger (absolute value) than conventional  elasticities.  Thus, if an 
increase  in competitiveness  is to generate  an increase  in export  values,  the 
sum of coefficients  should  be greater  than 0.84 in absolute  value. 
The price  effects  from  both equations  sum  to approximately  -1.9  with 
a mean  lag of eighteen  months. (The absolute  values of the price coeffi- 
cients are largest  and most significant  after  a year to eighteen  months.) 
The 16 percent  reduction  needed  to make  these estimates  comparable  to 
elasticities  of other studies  in which  the denominator  contains  only non- 
U.S. prices implies a long-run  export  price elasticity  in equation  6-1 of 
-1.6.  The long-run  elasticity  and timing  of the effects  are  very  similar  to 
those  found  by Dornbusch  and  Krugman  in their  market-shares  equations 
and by Magee, who reports  an annual  equation  for U.S. finished  manu- 
factures  fitted  for the period  from 1951 to 1969 with a price  elasticity  of 
-1.76.12 
Allowing  for lags of only a year  to eighteen  months  detracted  substan- 
tially from the explanatory  power of the equations.  Equations  with one 
and two lagged  price terms  had standard  errors  of 0.052 and 0.044, re- 
spectively,  as compared  with 0.035 in the specification  used here. They 
also had a significant  degree  of serial correlation  in the error  term.  Ex- 
tending  the lags on prices  slightly  worsened  the in-sample  fit of equations 
12. Dornbusch and Krugman estimate an elasticity of -1.72  for U.S. manufac- 
tured exports in Rudiger Dornbusch and Paul Krugman, "Flexible Exchange Rates 
in the Short Run," BPEA, 3:1976, p. 565. Magee's estimate appears in Stephen P. 
Magee, "Prices, Incomes, and Foreign Trade," in Peter B. Kenen, ed., International 
Trade and Finance: Frontiers for Research (London: Cambridge  University Press, 
1975), p. 182. Mordechai E. Kreinin also estimates an elasticity for U.S. exports of 
-1.7  in "The Effect of Exchange Rate Changes  on the Prices and Volume of Foreign 
Trade,"  International  Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, vol. 24 (July 1977), p. 321. Robert  Z. Lawrence  177 
6-1 and 6-2; it substantially  worsened  the out-of-sample  predictions  of 
equation 6-2, which are discussed below. Thus the lags shown were 
chosen even though the coefficients  for the longest lag used, or for an 
additional  lag when it was added,  were not negligible.  This suggests  that 
the ultimate  price elasticity  may be somewhat  larger  than the estimates 
shown  here. 
IMPORTS 
The import  equations  relate  the volume  of U.S. manufactured  imports, 
M, to potential  GNP in the United States,  Y*U2;13  the ratio of actual  to 
potential GNP in the United States (Y/Y*)US;  and distributed-lagged 
values  of the ratio  of import  unit  values  of manufactured  goods,  multiplied 
by a tariff  variable,  to the price  of domestic  manufactured  goods exclud- 
ing refined  petroleum  products,  IRPM. 
Output Effects.  The estimates  shown in both equations  6-3 and 6-4 
tell a similar  story relating  import volumes to U.S. output. Given that 
the economy  grows  along  its potential  path,  imports  will grow  about  three 
times as fast as potential.  For each percent  deviation  from  this path, im- 
ports  will  deviate  by about  2 percent  in the same  direction. 
Numerous  attempts  to develop  other  cyclical  variables  were  unsuccess- 
ful. Disaggregation  of the cycle into phases  according  to whether  the gap 
was above or below its long-run  average  or whether  it was closing or 
widening  contributed  little additional  explanation,  nor did modeling  non- 
linearity  into the cyclical  response.  Attempts  to capture  inventory  restock- 
ing and plant and equipment  expenditures  were also unsuccessful,  and 
lagged  cyclical  variables  were  insignificant. 
Price Effects.  The long-run  price elasticity  in both equations  6-3 and 
6-4 of 1.5 and 1.4, respectively,  are  quite  similar  to the 1.6 price  elasticity 
for exports.  The mean lags are also similar.  The most powerful  effects 
again  come after  a year  to eighteen  months. 
RECENT  PERIODS 
Equations  6-2 and 6-4, estimated  with data through  the first half of 
1975, permit  a closer examination  of manufactured-goods  trade during 
13. Potential GNP was taken from George L. Perry, "Potential  Output  and Pro- 
ductivity,"  BPEA, 1:1977, "Potential  I," p. 40. 178  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1978 
recent  half-years.  The first  point  to note is that  the equations  estimated  for 
both  import  and  export  volumes  are  not greatly  changed  by the two latest 
years  of data  despite  large  changes  in trade  volumes.  The output  and  price 
effects  do a satisfactory  job of explaining  the changes  that occurred. 
The percentage  prediction  errors  (actual  minus  predicted)  from  equa- 
tions 6-2 and 6-4 for the half-years  beyond  the sample  period  are: 
1976 
1975  1977 
Second half  First half  Second half  First half 
Export volume  -1.0  -6.9  -5.8  -2.8 
Import  volume  -12.6  -3.6  -1.3  -3.3 
Except for the large overprediction  of imports in the second half of 
1975, the out-of-sample  prediction  errors  are not large  when compared 
with the in-sample  standard  errors  of 3.6 in the export  equation  and 4.2 
in the import equation. Apparently  U.S. merchandise  trade in recent 
quarters  has been close to what should  have been expected,  given price 
and cyclical  developments  in the United  States  and abroad.  In particular, 
the data do not support  the notion  that  there  has been an unusually  large 
influx  of manufactured  imports. 
Although  the aggregate  changes  in manufactured  imports  can be ex- 
plained  in terms  of output  and  relative-price  changes,  a number  of factors 
account  for the recent  concern  over imports  into the United  States.  First, 
the total volume of manufactured  imports  rose 40.8 percent  from 1975 
to 1977-a  large increase  that followed declines  in import  volumes  be- 
tween 1973 and 1975. Although  understandable  in terms  of the recession 
and recovery  in the United States and the changing  competitiveness  of 
U.S. goods over this period, the reversals  during  this time are still con- 
spicuous.  Second,  the recent  increase  in imports  has corresponded  with a 
decline  in the overall  current-account  balance.  Third,  imports  have risen 
at a time of relatively  low utilization  of U.S. capacity  in industries  such as 
steel. Although  weak total demand  for steel in the United States is the 
primary  reason  for low utilization  rates, steel imports  receive  the major 
share  of the blame.  Fourth,  and perhaps  most important  for understand- 
ing perceptions,  was the change in import composition:  the values of 
imports  of manufactured  goods  from  developing  countries  and  Japan  rose 
far more sharply  than the overall value of manufactured  imports,  par- 
ticularly  in 1976. In 1975, the value of U.S. imports  of manufactured 
goods from LDCs  ($11.0  billion)  and from Japan ($11.2  billion) Robert  Z. Lawrence  179 
accounted  for 40.6 percent of the total value of manufactured-goods 
imports.  In the following year the value of manufactured  imports  from 
LDCs increased  by 40.6 percent, and those from Japan, 37.4 percent; 
together  they made up 45.1 percent  of the total value of manufactured 
imports."' 
Recent Goods Trade 
I now use equations  developed  for explaining  exports  and imports  of 
manufactured  goods to estimate  the effects  on the U.S. trade  balance  of 
changing  competitiveness  and  weak  cyclical  recovery  abroad.  These esti- 
mates  must  be understood  as relevant  to the hypothetical  question  of what 
would  have  happened  if output  and  price  developments  had  each  followed 
some other, specified  course. Without a fully integrated  model of the 
world economy, it is not possible to determine  whether the specified 
course  could have been maintained  or whether  exchange-rate  changes  or 
responses  within individual  economies would have led to price-output 
combinations  different  from those modeled here. Given this limitation, 
the present  exercise  is instructive  in understanding  the contribution  to the 
U.S. trade  balance  of those output  and relative-price  developments  that 
actually  occurred. 
As indicated  below  in the tabulation  of manufactured-goods  output  by 
years  and  half-years,  the United  States  and  the rest-of-the-world  aggregate 
used  in this  paper  both  experienced  severe  recessions  in 1975 when  judged 
by the ratio  of actual  to potential  manufactured-goods  output  (Q/Q*).15 
The recovery  in the United States  preceded  that in the rest of the world 
and, as of the first half of 1977, the U.S. recovery  had brought  output 
much nearer  to its potential  level than was the case abroad.  The most 
recent  figures  for industrial  production  indicate  that  output  gaps  widened 
further  (Q/Q*  fell)  in the rest of the world during  the second half of 
1977, while they narrowed  slightly  in the United States.  The following 
14. Data from the Bureau of the Census, Highlights of U.S. Export and Import 
Trade, table I-8A, various issues. The Japanese penetration is explained by a dra- 
matic improvement in  competitiveness: between 1975:1 and 1976:1 the ratio of 
Japanese  manufactured-goods  export unit values to U.S. manufactured-goods  import 
unit values fell by 12.5 percent. 
15. The data in the tabulation  are from Artus'  estimates  referred  to in text note 6; 
index for QUs and QROW,  1970  =  100. 180  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1978 
table  shows  output  and  output  relative  to potential  of manufactured  goods 
for  the  period  since  1972: 
QUS  QROW  (Q/Q*)US  (Q/Q*)ROW 
1972  111  107  0.96  0.96 
1973  120  117  1.02  0.99 
1974  114  117  0.95  0.96 
1975: Firsthalf  100  108  0.82  0.85 
Second  half  110  109  0.89  0.83 
1976: Firsthalf  116  115  0.92  0.87 
Second  half  118  118  0.93  0.87 
1977: First half  121  121  0.94  0.87 
In addition,  as table  4 showed,  relative  prices  of tradable  goods  changed 
during the 1975-77  period, sharply reducing the competitiveness of U.S. 
goods through  mid-1976 and  improving  it thereafter. 
Cyclical  output  effects are calculated  by estimating  what would have 
happened  to U.S. exports  and  imports  of manufactured  goods  if recovery 
in the rest  of the industrialized  world  had  kept  pace  with  that  in the United 
States-if,  in other words, the rest of the world had achieved  the U.S. 
ratio of actual  to potential  output  from  the second  half of 1975 through 
the first  half of 1977. The estimate,  derived  from  equations  6-1 and  6-3, is 
given in simulation  A of table 7. By the first  half of 1977, the value of 
manufactured  exports  would  have  been $8.4 billion  higher  than  it actually 
was. Because  U.S. imports  are unaffected,  the trade  balance  is also $8.4 
billion  higher  in this  case. 
Competitive  effects  are calculated  by estimating  what  would  have  hap- 
pened if U.S. relative  import  and export  prices  had been maintained  at 
their  levels of the first  half of 1975. In this case, equations  6-1 and 6-3 
indicate  that U.S. export  volumes  would have been 11.2 percent  higher 
and  import  volumes  5.0 percent  lower  than  they actually  were  in the first 
half of 1977. There are, however,  numerous  ways in which  U.S. relative 
prices could have remained  constant;  all yield the same estimate  with 
respect  to the volume  of trade,  but the dollar  value  of trade  differs  in each 
case. I consider  two polar cases. In the first,  foreign  prices  expressed  in 
dollars  are raised  to match the changes  in U.S. prices (simulation  B in 
table 7).  In the second, U.S. prices  are lowered  to match  the change  in 
foreign  prices (simulation  C). 
In simulation  B, U.S. exports  of manufactured  goods would  have  been 
$8.9 billion  higher  in the first  half of 1977. Imports,  however,  would  have Robert Z. Lawrence  181 
Table  7. Simulations  of Change  in U.S. Manufactured-Goods  Trade,  Based  on 
Equations  6-1 and  6-3, Alternative  Scenarios,  1975-77, by Half Years 
Billions  of dollars,  seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate 
1976 
Item in trade  balance  1975  1977 
and  simulation  Second  half  First half  Second  half  First  half 
Actual 
Exports  73.6  74.9  79.4  79.3 
Imports  51.2  61.1  67.8  74.1 
Balance  22.4  13.8  11.6  5.2 
Simulation  A 
Change  in exports  6.4  6.5  7.2-  8.4 
Change  in imports  0  0  0  0 
Change  in balance  6.4  6.5  7.2  8.4 
Simulation  B 
Change  in exports  -0.1  0.9  4.2  8.9 
Change  in imports  2.1  3.2  2.0  1.8 
Change  in balance  -2.0  -2.3  2.2  7.1 
Simulation  C 
Change  in exports  -5.5  -6.8  -2.6  4.4 
Change  in imports  *  -0.3  -1.6  -3.7 
Change  in balance  -5.5  -6.5  -1.0  8.1 
Source: Text table above. In simulation A,  (Q/Q*)ROW  =  (Q/Q*)US;  in simulation B, foreign prices 
are raised to match the change in U.S. prices; and in simulation C, U.S. prices are lowered to match the 
change in foreign prices. 
*Less than 0.05 billion. 
increased  by $1.8 billion and the trade balance would have risen by 
$7.1 billion. In simulation  C, lower U.S. prices  would have reduced  im- 
port values  by $3.7 billion in the first  half of 1977. Exports  would  have 
increased  by $4.4 billion. And the balance would have risen by $8.1 
billion. 
The time profile of these effects suggests  that the short-run  inelastic 
nature  of demand  can induce fairly substantial  J-curve  effects.  Looking 
at data on nominal  trade-value  shares  could prove very misleading.  In 
particular,  simulation  C implies  that if the U.S. competitive  position  had 
not declined  as a result of higher  relative  U.S. prices,  the trade  balance 
would have been less than it actually  was through  the second half of 
1976. By the first half of 1977, however,  the competitive  and cyclical 
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Factors  in the 1977 Deficit 
In a rough way, one can compare  the factors  behind the decline of 
$39.4 billion  in the trade  balance,  as measured  on a balance-of-payments 
basis (annual  rate) from the first  half of 1975 to the first  half of 1977. 
The measured  drop  in the balance  for fuels and lubricants  was $21.6 bil- 
lion. If the cyclical  recovery  in the rest of the world  had matched  that  in 
the United States,  exports  would  have been $10.2 billion higher.'6  If the 
United States  had maintained  its relative  competitive  position according 
to the partial-equilibrium  analysis  above, the balance  would have risen 
by $7.1 billion. In short, about half the decline in the balance  is asso- 
ciated  with oil, a quarter  with  the failure  of cyclical  recovery  abroad,  and 
roughly  one-fifth  with  competitive  deterioration.'7 
A sizable  part  of the trade  deficit  can  be attributed  to temporary  factors 
that could well disappear  within one and one-half  to two and one-half 
years-the  relevant horizon for  adjustment through exchange-rate 
changes.  In the first  half of 1977, for example,  in addition  to exports  of 
$10.2 billion that would have been forthcoming  if recovery  abroad  had 
matched  that in the United States,  the cost of U.S. coffee imports  would 
have been $3.0 billion lower if the coffee market  had been normal (as- 
suming  coffee  prices  at real 1973 levels). And average  weather  conditions 
would have reduced  the cost of oil imports  by $3.5 billion. 
However,  these temporary  effects  will have a permanent  impact:  they 
will change  the distribution  and total stock of assets  in the international 
economy.  Foreign  holdings  of dollar  assets  will be higher  than  they  other- 
wise would  be. To hold dollar  assets,  foreigners  will require  higher  yields 
that are explicitly  built into interest  rates or implicitly  into anticipated 
exchange-rate  changes. 
16. In addition to the $8.4 billion increase in manufactured-goods  exports de- 
rived from estimates  in the previous section, this calculation assumes  unitary income 
elasticity for U.S. exports of agricultural  products (nonfoods)  and nonagricultural 
crude  materials. 
17. Some observers argued that weak exports to Latin America are a further 
independent source of the declining U.S. trade balance. Exports to Latin America 
would have been $2.0 billion higher if Latin America had maintained the share of 
total U.S. export purchases it had in the first half of  1975. (The Latin American 
share actually fell from 18.6 percent to 16.5 percent, with Latin America defined  by 
the Bureau of the Census category, Western Hemisphere, excluding Canada.) This 
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Prospects  for 1978 
There  is reason  to suspect  that the deficit  might  increase  before  it de- 
clines primarily  because of developments  in manufactured-goods  trade. 
In 1978, the agricultural  and fuels and lubricants  balances  will resemble 
those  of 1977. The official  forecast  by the  U.S. Department  of Agriculture 
issued  on November  14, 1977, predicts  that  the agricultural  trade  balance 
will be $2.1 billion lower  in fiscal  year 1978 than  in fiscal  year 1977, but 
this decline appears  too large  because  it underestimates  export  prices.'8 
Allowing  for higher  grains  prices  and somewhat  lower beverage  costs 
leads  to a prediction  of little change  in the agricultural  trade  balance.  The 
increase  in the net demand  for oil in 1978 should  be met by the new sup- 
plies from the Alaskan pipeline.  Assuming  normal  weather  conditions, 
therefore,  1978 oil import  volumes  should  be the same  as those  in 1977.1' 
It now appears  that OPEC will keep prices at 1977 levels throughout 
1978; thus the oil bill should  not increase  over 1977 levels. 
Manufactured-goods  export and import  volumes  were projected  with 
equations  6-1 and 6-3. A forecast of 4.6 percent  GNP growth  for the 
United  States and the forecasts  of the other major  industrial  economies 
made in the December 1977 OECD Economic Outlook were used:20 
Allowance  was also made  for some improvements  in U.S. relative  prices 
as a result  of the dollar devaluations  through  January  1978. These pro- 
jections  suggested  that, overall, the U.S. trade  balance  would decline  to 
about  $39 billion in 1978. 
18. Although the  estimates include sales of  about 15 million metric tons of 
wheat and feed grains to the Soviet Union, unit values for these grains of  $100 
and $95 a metric ton seem too low. Judging  by futures prices (with an allowance for 
transportation  costs),  wheat unit values of $120 a metric ton and feed-grains unit 
values of $105 a ton are more realistic projections. 
-  19. This forecast is based on the following assumptions: oil from the Alaskan 
pipeline will flow at its capacity rate of  1.2 mbd by spring 1978 as scheduled, and 
0.5 mbd will  be stored in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; hydroelectric power 
shortages  will decline to the equivalent of 0.19 mbd; and oil production  in the lower 
forty-eight  states will decline by 4 percent. The total demand for energy is assumed 
to increase  to 105 percent  of the estimated  normal 1977 demand. 
20. The GNP forecasts made by the OECD of  3 percent for the four major 
European  economies, 3.75 percent for Canada, and 5 percent for Japan were used 
to predict manufacturing  output in these countries on the basis of the historic rela- 
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Concluding  Comments 
The nation's  trade  balance  is a residual  item  that  reflects  the interaction 
of a number  of domestic  and  foreign  factors  such  as rates  of growth,  rates 
of inflation,  tastes,  factor  endowments.  There  is no need for an economy 
to have exports  equal in value to imports-by  commodity  category,  by 
trading  partner,  or in total. Indeed,  it is precisely  because  monetary  ex- 
change  removes  the need  for bilateral  balancing  that  it is superior  to barter 
in facilitating  specialization.  What  matters  is not the trade  balance  itself 
but the factors that lie behind it. A particular  value for the balance is 
satisfactory  only if it is associated  with an acceptable  configuration  of 
other,  more  important,  national  and  international  objectives. 
Behind the 1977 U.S. trade balance lie some positive developments 
and others  that policy should  attempt  to change.  The sustained  recovery 
in the United  States,  the rapid  growth  of productive  capacities  in develop- 
ing countries,  and the restoration  of relative calm to the international 
grains market are all positive factors despite their contributions  to the 
trade deficit. In these areas it is important  that certain  policies not be 
adopted. 
An economy  as closed  as the United  States  should  not reduce  its aggre- 
gate demand  in order  to lower its imports,  particularly  when, as in De- 
cember 1977, it is already  operating  with an unemployment  rate of 6.4 
percent and with only 83 percent of its industrial  capacity  utilized. A 
trade  deficit  entails  a large  government  deficit  at full employment  (given 
private net savings), and this makes a balanced  budget an even more 
unsuitable  target  for policy. 
Economic  expansion  at home is also needed  to assist  in the absorption 
of workers  who are inevitably  displaced  by secular  changes  in the U.S. 
comparative  advantage,  and  to help  ward  off the adoption  of protectionist 
measures  such  as tariffs,  quotas,  or so-called  voluntary  trade  restrictions.2' 
It is inappropriate  to protect  U.S. industries  on a selective  basis.  Such  pol- 
21.  Selective measures might actually worsen the trade balance in some cases. 
Despite a 36 percent increase in the volume of U.S. imports of iron and steel mill 
products from Japan in 1976, the value of U.S. steel imports from Japan rose by 
only 3 percent. Apparently the reduction in prices almost offset the volume sold. If 
steel demand from particular  producers  is inelastic (the apparent  belief of domestic 
U.S. producers), Japanese  price cutting  would help the balance  of trade;  a "reference- 
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icies  harm  the  more  efficient  U.S. producers,  particularly  those  who manu- 
facture  exportables,  as they  keep  the exchange  rate  higher  than  it would  be 
otherwise.  Punishing  the productive  sector  is obviously  bad social  policy. 
Adjustment  assistance  is the required  response  for workers  whose indus- 
tries can no longer compete.  Devaluation  is the appropriate  method of 
improving  an economy's  competitive  situation.  In the long run, protec- 
tionism  would prove counterproductive:  it would encourage  retaliation 
by other  countries,  which could further  harm  U.S. exporters,  thereby  re- 
ducing  both the prospects  for recovery  and  the gains  from  trade.  In addi- 
tion, Korea, Taiwan,  Hong Kong, Brazil, and Mexico, which are at last 
rising  from poverty,  should not be deprived  of the gains from trade-led 
growth. 
On  the agricultural  front,  an  international  agreement  for providing  ade- 
quate  world  stocks  of wheat  and  grains  should  be concluded  before large 
cutbacks  in production  are induced.  High grain  prices  may help U.S. ex- 
ports  in the short  run,  but  by raising  domestic  inflation  and  by encouraging 
other countries  to aim at self-sufficiency,  they harm exports  in the long 
run. 
In other areas,  however,  there are policies that must  be adopted.  The 
U.S. government  has to decide upon an energy  policy to remove  the un- 
certainties  that hinder  energy  conservation  and encourage  inefficient  fuel 
use. The probable  gains from an energy  policy will take time to accrue, 
but in the short  run  the adoption  of a plan could  bolster  confidence  in the 
dollar.  There  are  some  measures  that  could  have  important  effects  even  in 
the short  run.  In particular,  the current  bias  that  favors  oil and  gas imports 
over domestic  production  should  be corrected.  The refined-petroleum  en- 
titlements  system  and the practice  of encouraging  imports  of natural  gas 
at 50 to 100 percent  above  interstate  price  ceilings are  inefficient  because 
users  do not pay the marginal  cost, and this inefficiency  is harmful  to the 
trade  balance. 
There  is a need for more  expansionary  policies  in the major  industrial 
nations  abroad.  Such policies would meet their own domestic  as well as 
international  requirements.  The failure of major economies  to achieve 
their own growth  targets  during  1977 signals  the need for action. Such 
policies could directly  wipe out one-third  of the U.S. deficit  over a few 
years.  They  could  also alleviate  some  of the problems  faced  by the smaller 
industrial  and developing  economies.  The simplest  way for Japan and 
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penalizing  their export industries,  is to increase their own demand  for 
goods  from  abroad  by expansionary  policies. 
Probably  the greatest  controversy  surrounds  the appropriate  U.S. ex- 
change  rate. It is easy to advocate  an optimal  exchange-rate  intervention 
policy but nearly  impossible  to implement  it in practice.  Intervention  is 
appropriate  in response  to disorderly  markets  or to disturbances  that  will 
reverse  themselves,  such as crop failures.  However,  when the change  is 
fundamental,  avoiding  the need  for adjustment  will eventually  mean  hav- 
ing to do too much  too late. Smaller  adjustments  are preferable  to large 
discrete  shocks.  The large  recent  bilateral  changes  in exchange  rates are 
in part  the consequence  of unwise  intervention  in the past.22 
One of the best ways to undermine  faith in the dollar  and to induce  a 
shift into other currencies  is to support  the value of the dollar  when its 
long-run  determinants  signal a decline.  The responsibility  of the United 
States as the major  reserve-currency  country  is to avoid having  its inter- 
national  accounts  approach  a state  of fundamental  disequilibrium,  rather 
than to avoid change  at all costs. The United States  should demonstrate 
its concern  for the value of the dollar by its pursuit  of policies that in- 
fluence  the dollar's  basic determinants:  policies  to reduce  domestic  infla- 
tion, establish a long-run energy strategy,  and promote a prosperous, 
coordinated,  international  economy. 
Discussion 
GARY  SMEAL  complimented  Lawrence  on his paper  but  disagreed  with  his 
analysis  of the role of the U.S. competitive  position. He noted that an 
index of relative  wholesale  prices compiled  by the Treasury  and one for 
relative  prices  of manufactured  goods  compiled  by the International  Mon- 
etary  Fund showed  considerably  smaller  competitive  deteriorations  than 
the index of relative  export  prices  Lawrence  had used.  He also noted  that 
22. The necessity for a 22 percent change in the yen-dollar exchange rate from 
December 1976 to December 1977 (and the political friction that resulted as a con- 
sequence of Japanese market penetration into the United States) might have been 
avoided if the Japanese  had not pegged the yen in 1975 and 1976. The change in the 
Japanese  current account of -$0.7  billion and $3.8 billion in 1975 and 1976 were 
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the shares of world trade in manufactured  -goods as calculated  by the 
Department  of Commerce  on the basis of export  values showed  a much 
smaller  decline in the U.S. share than did Lawrence's  data. Smeal also 
stressed  that administration  officials  have used these and other facts to 
show that there has been no significant  loss of competitiveness  between 
1976 and 1977 or over a longer period such as 1970-77. By contrast, 
Lawrence  had stressed  the loss of competitiveness  relative  to 1975, a year 
of unusual  strength  for the dollar.  He added  that Lawrence's  finding  of 
substantial  price effects  on exports  and imports  in 1977 stemming  from 
competitive  effects  dating  back  to 1975 placed  his estimates  near  one ex- 
treme  of the range  of professional  estimates,  most  of which  indicated  lower 
elasticities  and shorter  lags. 
In response, Lawrence  agreed  that no single index should be relied 
upon  to measure  competitiveness,  but noted  that all indexes  showed  some 
erosion  and that  the relative-price  index  for manufactured-goods  imports 
showed a steady deterioration  right through  mid-1977. He pointed out 
that value shares  such as those computed  by the Commerce  Department 
were particularly  unreliable  indicators  of competitiveness  because  of the 
inelastic  response  to prices  in the short  run.  He defended  his estimates  of 
price  elasticities,  noting  that  in his  paper  he had  reported  other  studies  that 
corroborated  the elasticities  and  timing  of the  price  effects  he  had  obtained. 
Some suggestions  were  made  for improving  the specification  of the im- 
port equations.  George von Furstenberg  suggested  disaggregating  GNP 
within an input-output  formulation  in order to capture the effects of 
changes  in its composition  among  components  with different  import  in- 
tensities.  Robert  Solomon  believed  it might  be hard  to disentangle  cyclical 
swings  in foreign  investment  demand  from  price  effects;  on closer  analysis 
the  recent  weakness  of investment  abroad  might  explain  more  of the recent 
deterioration  of U.S. manufactured  exports,  which are heavily  weighted 
by capital  goods. R. A. Gordon  thought  it was important  in explaining 
recent  trade  flows  to model  explicitly  the changes  in long-run  comparative 
advantage  that  lay behind  the growing  success  of less developed  countries 
in competing  in manufactured-goods  trade.  Lawrence  replied  that while 
explaining  individual  country  shares  might  require  such an analysis,  aver- 
age price and income changes  provided  an adequate  explanation  for the 
aggregate  changes  in manufactured-goods  trade without  making  special 
allowance  for the export  success  of the less developed  countries  or other 
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Hendrik  Houthakker  raised  the issue of whether  exchange  rates  reflect 
primarily  the balance  in the trade account,  the current  account,  or the 
capital  account.  He had concluded  that  the trade  account  is far more  im- 
portant  than  a monetarist  approach  would  imply:  indeed,  except  for very 
short-term  fluctuations,  exchange  rates  among  industrial  nations  primarily 
mirror  export  prices.  He believed  that an average  of all export  prices,  as 
opposed  to those  for manufacturing  alone  that  Lawrence  had  investigated, 
would show exchange  rates moving so as to keep relative  dollar prices 
among  countries  unchanged.  Solomon  observed  that  in both  Germany  and 
Japan  in recent  years, cyclical  movements  in the domestic  economy  had 
resulted  in movements  in exchange  rates in the opposite direction.  The 
upward  pressure  from  the effects  of economic  slack  on the current  account 
had dominated  the downward  pressure  from the effects of low interest 
rates  on the capital  account.  The variations  of the dollar  since 1975 also 
follow this pattern,  whereas  in the 1960s, movements  in the capital  ac- 
count  had  tended  to dominate  the current  account.  Walter  Salant  reasoned 
that wide publicity  about  the trade  deficit  was likely  to lead to additional 
weakening  of the capital  account  because  it stimulated  expectations  of de- 
preciation;  but in its direct effect on exchange  rates, he doubted  that a 
dollar  of trade  deficit  was different  from  a dollar  of deficit  elsewhere  in the 
balance  of payments.  Houthakker  observed  that the current  account  had 
become  more  conspicuous  because  figures  for other  balances  are  no longer 
published.  He suggested  that at least a basic balance  and an overall  bal- 
ance  be reported. 
Discussants  were  divided  on the issue  of whether  the government  ought 
to intervene  to support  the dollar. Lawrence  Krause  felt that Lawrence 
had offered  a timely  demonstration  that there  were fundamental  reasons 
for some decline  in the value of the dollar.  He observed  that  foreign  gov- 
ernments-anxious to enlarge  the U.S. deficit  and in the process  reduce 
their own and stimulate  their economies-had  intervened  in the past to 
support  the dollar  on the grounds  that  no change  in basic competitiveness 
had occurred.  But Lawrence  had  shown  that  a substantial  loss of competi- 
tiveness  had in fact occurred  and  that  it was appropriate  for the dollar  to 
decline  in response.  Some other  participants  saw more  merit  in interven- 
tion. William  Cline cautioned  that because  the dollar  had moved down 
considerably  further  in recent  months  subsequent  to Lawrence's  data  set, 
and  because  of the ambiguity  of some  of the measures  of competitiveness, 
it might  be inappropriate  to conclude  that  intervention  should  be rejected. Robert  Z. Lawrence  189 
The exchange  rate reacts  to the contemporary  current-account  balance, 
but trade  flows  respond  to changes  in the rate only after  a lag. Excessive 
depreciation  of the dollar  now in response  to a highly  unfavorable  current 
account  could induce an excessive increase  in the trade balance in the 
future.  If this were the case, some intervention  (at least enough  to frus- 
trate  the "one-way  bet" over the medium  term) would  be appropriate  in 
order  to avoid unnecessary  cycling  in the exchange  rate and the current 
account.  John Kareken  reasoned  that, with flexible exchange  rates and 
free movements  of capital, there might be no well-defined  equilibrium 
exchange  rate. Governments  might  have to intervene,  or at least threaten 
to do so, if they wanted to keep rates from changing  indiscriminately. 
Bruce MacLaury  noted that, within a broad range of exchange  rates, 
private  markets  might  stabilize  at whatever  point governments  indicated 
a willingness  to intervene,  while,  in the absence  of some  intervention  from 
the government,  rates  might  fluctuate  excessively,  overshooting  the equi- 
librium  range. Others  pointed out that it was impossible  to determine 
when markets  were overshooting  and therefore  when they could be sta- 
bilized  profitably  by intervention. 